# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

KELVIN MARION, Inmate #06032-028,	)
Plaintiff,	)
vs.	) CIVIL NO. 06-799-MJR
DARLENE VELTRI and TIMOTHY ADESANYA,	) ) )
Defendants.	)

## MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

### **REAGAN, District Judge:**

Plaintiff, an inmate in the Federal Correctional Institution in Greenville, Illinois, brings this action for alleged violations of his constitutional rights by persons acting under the color of federal authority. *See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents*, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In this action, he complains that each Defendant denied him medical treatment for unspecified foot ailments. Because they denied his requests for treatment, he suffered excruciating pain for years before finally being referred to a specialist.

The Supreme Court has recognized that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). This encompasses a broader range of conduct than intentional denial of necessary medical treatment, but it stops short of "negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition." *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 106. *See also Jones v. Simek*, 193 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1999); *Steele v. Choi*, 82 F.3d 175, 178 (7th Cir. 1996), *cert. denied*, 519 U.S. 897 (1996). The Seventh Circuit considers the following to be indications of a serious medical need: (1) where failure to treat the condition could "result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain"; (2) "[e]xistence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment"; (3)

"presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual's daily activities"; or (4) "the existence of chronic and substantial pain". *Gutierrez v. Peters*, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997).

Applying these standards to the allegations in the amended complaint, the Court is unable to dismiss any portion of this action at this point in the litigation. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

## **APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL**

Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 8). When deciding whether to appoint counsel, the Court must first determine if a *pro se* litigant has made reasonable efforts to secure counsel before resorting to the courts. *Gil v. Reed*, 381 F.3d 649, 656 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004), *quoting Jackson v. County of McLean*, 953 F.2d 1070, 1072 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1992). Plaintiff states that he contacted only the ACLU and the Illinois State Bar Association; this does not constitute "reasonable efforts" to retain counsel. Therefore, the Court finds that appointment of counsel is not warranted at this time. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel is **DENIED**.

#### **DISPOSITION**

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall complete and submit a USM-285 form for Defendants VELTRI, ADESANYA, the UNITED STATES ATTORNEY for the SOUTHERN DISTRICT of ILLINOIS and the ATTORNEY GENERAL of the UNITED STATES within THIRTY (30) DAYS of the date of entry of this Memorandum and Order. The Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff FOUR (4) USM-285 forms with Plaintiff's copy of this Memorandum and Order. Plaintiff is advised that service will not be made on a defendant until Plaintiff submits a properly completed USM-285 form for that defendant.

The Clerk is **DIRECTED** to prepare Form 1A (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons) and Form 1B (Waiver of Service of Summons) for Defendants **VELTRI** and **ADESANYA**. The Clerk shall forward those forms, USM-285 forms submitted by Plaintiff, and sufficient copies of the complaint, including copies for the United States Attorney and the Attorney

General, to the United States Marshal for service.

The United States Marshal is **DIRECTED**, pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to serve process on Defendants **VELTRI** and **ADESANYA** in the manner specified by Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, *and* on the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois and the Attorney General of the United States, Washington, D.C., pursuant to Rule 4(I) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. All costs of service shall be advanced by the United States. For purposes of computing the passage of time under Rule 4(d)(2), the Court and all parties will compute time as of the date it is mailed by the Marshal, as noted on the USM-285 form.

With respect to former employees of Bureau of Prisons who no longer can be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the Bureau of Prisons shall furnish the Marshal with the defendant's last-known address upon issuance of a court order which states that the information shall be used only for purposes of effectuating service (or for proof of service, should a dispute arise) and any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Marshal. Address information obtained from the B.O.P. pursuant to this order shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Marshal.

The United States Marshal shall file returned waivers of service as well as any requests for waivers of service that are returned as undelivered as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service is not returned by a defendant within **THIRTY (30) DAYS** from the date of mailing the request for waiver, the United States Marshal shall:

- Request that the Clerk prepare a summons for that defendant who has not yet returned a waiver of service; the Clerk shall then prepare such summons as requested.
- Personally serve process upon the defendant pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 566(c).
- Within ten days after personal service is effected, the United States Marshal shall file the return of service for the defendant, along with evidence of any attempts to secure a waiver of service of process and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting

service on said defendant. Said costs shall be enumerated on the USM-285 form and shall include the costs incurred by the Marshal's office for photocopying additional copies of the summons and complaint and for preparing new USM-285 forms, if

required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served defendant in accordance with the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) unless the

defendant shows good cause for such failure.

Plaintiff is **ORDERED** to serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon that attorney, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for

consideration by this Court. He shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the

Court a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to

defendant or his counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not

been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the

Court.

Defendants are **ORDERED** to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the

complaint, and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this cause is **REFERRED** to a United States Magistrate

Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire matter is hereby **REFERRED** to a United States Magistrate Judge for

disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties

consent to such a referral.

Plaintiff is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk and each opposing party informed

of any change in his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than seven (7) days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this 7<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2007.

s/ Michael J. Reagan

MICHAEL J. REAGAN United States District Judge